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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Alesha Ann Green was arrested for driving without a valid license, although 
Idaho Code § 49-1407 did not authorize the arresting officer to arrest her under the 
circumstances. As a result of the unlawful arrest, and a search of her person and 
vehicle incident to arrest, officers found alleged drugs, paraphernalia, and other 
evidence. Ms. Green was charged with felony trafficking in methamphetamine, felony 
possession of a controlled substance, and other offenses. The district court granted 
Ms. Green's motions to suppress the evidence found as a result of the unlawful arrest 
under Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. The district court found that Ms. Green's 
unlawful arrest was unreasonable because it was contrary to I.C. § 49-1407. Based on 
State v. Card, 137 Idaho 182 (2002), the district court found that suppression was the 
appropriate remedy for the violation. The State appealed, arguing that the district court 
erred when it granted the motions to suppress because the arrest was reasonable. 
(App. Br., pp.4-10.) 
In this consolidated appeal, Ms. Green asserts that the district court correctly 
found that her arrest was unreasonable under Article I, § 17, on the basis that the arrest 
was unreasonable because the statutory violation impacted her constitutional rights. 
Because her arrest was unreasonable, the district court correctly found that suppression 
was the appropriate remedy. Thus, the district court's order granting her motions to 
suppress should be affirmed. 
Ms. Green respectfully requests that the Idaho Supreme Court retain this case, 
because it presents a matter of first impression before this Court: whether Card has 
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been abrogated by later decisions of this Court. The Idaho Court of Appeals has 
suggested that Card has been abrogated. v. Branigh, 155 Idaho 404, 414 
(Ct. App. 2013), rev. denied (Dec. 9, 2013). 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Ada County Sheriff's Office Deputy Joe Richardson stopped Ms. Green for failing 
to maintain her lane of travel. (R., pp.161, 318.) Ms. Green admitted she knew her 
driver's license was invalid, and Deputy Richardson arrested her for driving on an 
invalid license. (R., pp.161, 318.) Idaho state statutes provide that an individual may 
be arrested for driving without a valid license "[w]hen the person does not furnish 
satisfactory evidence of identity or when the officer has reasonable and probable 
grounds to believe the person will disregard a written promise to appear in court." See 
I.C. §§ 49-236, 49-301, 49-1407(1 ). However, Deputy Richardson had no reason to 
believe that Ms. Green was someone other than who she claimed to be, or that she 
would not appear for court. (R., pp.161, 318.) 
Ms. Green and her car were searched incident to arrest, and alleged drugs and 
drug paraphernalia were found on her person, and $6500 in cash was found in her car. 
(R., pp.161, 318.) After she was transported to the Ada County Jail, Ms. Green made 
incriminating statements. (R., pp.161, 318.) Ms. Green also gave her consent to 
search her hotel room, where a digital scale and plastic baggies were found. 
(R., pp.161, 318.) 
In Ada County No. CR 2012-6591, the Grand Jury of Ada County accused 
Ms. Green by Indictment of the crimes of trafficking in methamphetamine, felony, in 
violation of Idaho Code § 37-2732B(a)(4)(B), and trafficking in methamphetamine, 
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felony, in violation of I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(4)(A). (R., 1 ) In Ada County No. 
CR 2012-14612, Ms. Green was accused by Information of the crimes of possession of 
a controlled substance with the intent to deliver, felony, in violation of I.C. § 37-2732(a), 
possession of drug paraphernalia, misdemeanor, in violation of I.C. § 37-2734A, and 
driving without obtaining a driver's license, misdemeanor, in violation of I.C. § 49-301. 
(R., pp.228-29.) 
Ms. Green filed Motions to Suppress Evidence in both cases, requesting that the 
district court suppress certain evidence seized in violation of her United States and 
Idaho constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, 
because her arrest violated I.C. § 49-1407. (R., pp.112-15, ) Specifically, she 
requested that any evidence seized as a result of the unlawful arrest, as well as her 
statements and any evidence located at the hotel room, be suppressed. (R., pp.113, 
115, 273, 275.) 
After a hearing, the district court issued an Order Granting Motion to Suppress 
Evidence covering both cases. (R., pp.160-71, 317-28.) As the parties had agreed, the 
district court found that the arrest was in violation of I.C. § 49-1407, which specifies 
when an officer may arrest an individual for driving without a valid driver's license, and 
therefore the arrest was "unlawful" in terms of compliance with state law. (R., pp.165 & 
n.3, 322 & n.3.) The district court then found that Ms. Green's unlawful arrest was 
unreasonable within the meaning of Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution, because it 
was directly contrary to I.C. § 49-1407. (R., pp.165-66, 322-23.) Deputy Richardson 
had testified at the preliminary hearing that he did not have a justification under Idaho 
law for arresting Ms. Green. (R., pp.165-66, 322-23.) The district court also found, in 
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light of State v. Card, 137 Idaho 182 (2002), that suppression was the appropriate 
remedy for the constitutional violation. (R., pp.1 324-26.) Thus, the district court 
granted Ms. Green's motions to suppress. (R., pp.170, 327.) 
The State filed Notices of Appeal timely from the district court's Order Granting 
Motion to Suppress Evidence in both cases. (R., pp.178-81, 334-37.) The Idaho 
Supreme Court consolidated the appeals. (R., p.2.) 
4 
ISSUES 
The State frames the issue on appeal as follows: 
This case raises an issue of first impression. In Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 
(2008), the United States Supreme Court determined that the arrest standard 
under the Fourth Amendment was probable cause, independent of state law. 
While recognizing this, the district court determined that the reasonableness of 
an arrest under Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho State Constitution depended on 
strict adherence to state statutes. Did the district court err when it decided that 
the Idaho State Constitution should be interpreted differently than the United 
States Constitution? 
Ms. Green rephrases the issue as: 
Did the district court correctly grant Ms. Green's motions to suppress, because 
her arrest was unreasonable under Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution and 
suppression was therefore the appropriate remedy? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Correctly Granted Ms. Green's Motions To Suppress, Because Her 
Arrest Was Unreasonable Under Article I, § 17 Of The Idaho Constitution And 
Suppression Was Therefore The Appropriate Remedy 
A. Introduction 
Ms. Green asserts that the district court correctly granted her motions to 
suppress. Her arrest was unreasonable under Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution, 
on the basis that it was a violation of state law that impacted her constitutional rights. 
Because her arrest was unreasonable, the district court correctly found that suppression 
was the appropriate remedy. Thus, the district court's order granting Ms. Green's 
motions to suppress should be affirmed. 
The State argues that the protections of Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution 
and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution are coextensive in this 
context, and because Ms. Green's arrest was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment 
in light of Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008), her arrest was also reasonable under 
Article I, § 17. However, long-standing jurisprudence actually indicates that Article 
I, § 17 is more protective than the Fourth Amendment in this context. The Idaho 
Supreme Court has held that a violation of state law that impacts constitutional rights 
renders a search or seizure unreasonable under Article I,§ 17. The violation of I.C. § 
49-1407 in this case impacted Ms. Green's constitutional rights, making her arrest 
unreasonable under Article I, § 17. Because Ms. Green's arrest was unreasonable, the 
district court correctly found that suppression is the appropriate remedy here. Finally, 
the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in State v. Card, 137 Idaho 182 (2002), the basis 
for the district court's finding on suppression, has not been abrogated by later decisions. 
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B. Standard Of Review And Applicable Law 
"On review of a decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence," an 
appellate court "employs a split standard of review." State v. Dominguez, 137 Idaho 
681, 682 (Ct. App. 2002). 'The appellate court will not overturn the trial court's factual 
findings unless they are clearly erroneous. However, the application of constitutional 
standards to the facts found by the district court is given free review." State v. Wright, 
134 Idaho 79, 81 (2000). 
On appeal, an appellate court "will uphold the decision of a trial court if any 
alternative legal basis can be found to support it." Hanf v. Syringa Realty, Inc., 120 
Idaho 364, 370 (1991 ). 
Generally, an Idaho police officer may, without a warrant, make an arrest for a 
misdemeanor committed in the officer's presence. I.C. § 19-603(1 ). However, this 
general arrest authority is limited with respect to misdemeanor violations of Title 49 of 
the Idaho Code, which governs the operation of motor vehicles. See State v. Foldesi, 
131 Idaho 778, 781 (Ct. App. 1998). "Whenever a person is halted by a peace officer 
for a misdemeanor traffic violation and is not taken before a magistrate as required or 
permitted by this title, the officer shall issue a citation as provided by section 19-3901, 
Idaho Code, and by rule of the supreme court." I.C. § 49-1409. "Thus, for 
misdemeanor traffic violations, an officer must issue a citation rather than make an 
arrest unless there exist circumstances under which an arrest is specifically 'required or 
permitted' under Title 49." Foldesi, 131 Idaho at 781-82. 
Operating a motor vehicle in Idaho without a valid driver's license is a 
misdemeanor under Title 49. I.C. § 49-236 & 49-301. Title 49 does not require an 
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for driving without a valid license, and permits an arrest for that offense only 
under the limited circumstances outlined in I.C. § 49-1407. Foldesi, 131 Idaho at 782. 
Section 49-1407, in relevant part, provides that a person may be arrested "[w]hen the 
person does not furnish satisfactory evidence of identity or when the officer has 
reasonable and probable grounds to believe the person will disregard a written promise 
to appear in court." I.C. § 49-1407(1). 
Here, the district court found that Deputy Richardson had no reason to believe 
that Ms. Green was someone other than who she claimed to be, or that she would not 
appear for court. (R., pp.161, 318.) Thus, as the parties agreed and the district court 
found, Ms. Green's arrest was "unlawful" in terms of lack of compliance with I.C. § 49-
1407. ( See R., p.165 & n.3, p.322 & n.3.) At issue is whether Ms. Green's unlawful 
arrest was unreasonable under Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. 
C. Ms. Green's Arrest Was Unreasonable Under Article I, § 17, Because It Was A 
Statutory Violation That Impacted Her Constitutional Rights 
Ms. Green asserts that her arrest was unreasonable under Article I, § 17 of the 
Idaho Constitution, on the basis that it was a statutory violation that impacted her 
constitutional rights. While an unlawful arrest does not violate the Fourth Amendment, 
long-standing jurisprudence indicates that Article I, § 17 is more protective than the 
Fourth Amendment in this context. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a violation 
of state law that impacts constitutional rights renders a search or seizure unreasonable 
under Article I,§ 17. The violation of I.C. § 49-1407 in this case impacted Ms. Green's 
constitutional rights, making her arrest unreasonable under Article I, § 17. 
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Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution and the parallel provision in the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution both protect an individual's right to be free 
from "unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV; Idaho Const. Art. I, 
§ 17. "[A] person is 'seized' only when, by means of physical force or a show of 
authority, his freedom of movement is restrained." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 
U.S. 544, 553 (1980). An arrest is "the quintessential seizure of the person." 
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also State v. Agundis, 127 Idaho 587, 592-93 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the analyses 
from Mendenhall and Hodari D. apply to seizures under Article I,§ 17). 
"Searches and seizures performed without a warrant are presumptively 
unreasonable," and the State has the burden of showing that a warrantless search or 
seizure fell within an exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 
300, 302 (2007). One exception to the warrant requirement under Article I, § 17 and the 
Fourth Amendment is the search incident to arrest exception. An officer conducting a 
lawful custodial arrest may search the person of the arrestee and the immediately 
surrounding area without a warrant, because of the need to remove weapons and to 
prevent the destruction of evidence. Chime/ v. California, 394 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). 
Officers may also search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest, but only if the 
arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the 
search or it is reasonable to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of 
arrest. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009); State v. Frederick, 149 Idaho 509, 
515 (2010). 
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In Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008), the United Supreme Court held 
that Virginia police officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they arrested a 
motorist whom they had probable cause to believe had violated a Virginia state statute 
by driving with a suspended license, even though the state statute did not authorize the 
officers to arrest the motorist. Moore, 553 U.S. at 166-67, 178. The Moore Court 
concluded that state laws do not alter the reasonableness of an arrest for purposes of 
the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 173-76. Because the officers had probable cause, the 
Court held that the arrest of the motorist was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment 
despite the violation of state law. Id. at 178. 
However, the Moore Court also recognized that "[i]ndividual States may surely 
construe their own constitutions as imposing more stringent constraints on police 
conduct than does the Federal Constitution." Id. at 172 (quoting California v. 
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in 
original). Thus, Idaho courts are "free to interpret our state constitution as more 
protective of the rights of Idaho citizens than the United States Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the federal constitution." State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 987 (1992) 
(citations omitted). Although, as the State notes, the language of Article I, § 17 and the 
Fourth Amendment are substantially similar (App. Br., p.8), the Idaho Supreme Court 
has held that "[t]he similarity of language and purpose ... does not require this Court to 
follow United States Supreme Court precedent in interpreting our own constitution." 
State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469, 471 (2001 ). "Long gone are the days when state 
courts will blindly apply United States Supreme Court interpretation and methodology 
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when in the process of interpreting their own constitutions." State v. Newman, 1 
Idaho 5, 10 n.6 (1985). 
The Idaho Supreme Court recently explained that, "when interpreting the Idaho 
Constitution, this Court will use federal rules and methodology unless clear precedent or 
circumstances unique to the State of Idaho or its constitution indicates that Idaho's 
constitution provides greater protection than the analogous federal provision." GOA 
Dairy Queen, Inc. v. State Ins. Fund, 154 Idaho 379, 384 (2013). Thus, the Idaho 
Supreme Court has held that, in some instances, Article I, § 17 provides greater 
protections to individuals than the parallel provision in the Fourth Amendment, "based 
on the uniqueness of our state, our Constitution, and our long-standing jurisprudence." 
Id. at 383-84 (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, long-standing jurisprudence 
alone has indicated that Article I, § 17 provides greater protections in certain contexts. 
For example, the Idaho Supreme Court, "based on long-standing jurisprudence 
regarding the Idaho Constitution" and Idaho's exclusionary rule, has rejected the United 
States Supreme Court's good faith exception to the warrant requirement. Donato, 135 
Idaho at 472 (citing Guzman, 122 Idaho at 991-93); see State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 
511 (2012). 
Long-standing jurisprudence regarding the Idaho Constitution also indicates that 
Article I, § 17 provides greater protections in this context. The Idaho Supreme Court 
has repeatedly held that a violation of state law that impacts constitutional rights renders 
a search or seizure unreasonable under Article I,§ 17. 
In State v. Rauch, 99 Idaho 586 (1978), the Idaho Supreme Court held that "[t]he 
very sanctity of the home that underlies the passage of 'knock and announce' 
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statutes . . requires that we exclude evidence seized as a result of violation of 
those statutes." Rauch, 99 Idaho at 593. In Rauch, officers entered a residence without 
complying with the requirements of Idaho's knock and announce statutes, and seized 
evidence from inside the residence. Id. at 588. The Rauch Court affirmed the district 
court's suppression of the evidence, explaining that knock and announce statutes were 
the result of the "basic right to be secure in a person's home." Id. at 592-93. "The very 
need for compliance with 'knock and announce' statutes and the great danger from 
noncompliance requires strict enforcement." Id. at 592. No exigent circumstances 
justified noncompliance, and thus it was proper to grant the suppression motion. Id. at 
593. "Any other result would completely nullify the 'knock and announce' statutes and 
would create a dangerous situation for citizen and policeman alike." Id. 
The suppression of the evidence in Rauch, although it involved a statutory 
violation, was based on the statutory violation's impact on constitutional rights 
guaranteed by Article I,§ 17, which made the search unreasonable. The Rauch Court 
stated that "[t]he value of the exclusionary rule was recognized by this Court long before 
the United States Supreme Court required it for fourth amendment violations." Id. "The 
rule is well settled in this state that evidence, procured in violation of defendant's 
constitutional immunity from search and seizure, is inadmissible and will be excluded if 
request for its suppression be timely made." Id. at 592-93 (quoting State v. Conner, 59 
Idaho 695, 703 (1939)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court, quoting a dissent 
by Justice Morgan, further explained that the "necessity to exclude illegally seized 
evidence" is predicated on how "evidence procured by an illegal or unreasonable 
search ... was procured by an invasion of the rights guaranteed to all persons within 
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by sec. 17, art. 1, of the [Idaho] Constitution .... " Id. at 593 (quoting State v. 
Anderson, 31 Idaho 514,527 (1918) (Morgan, J., dissenting)). 
The Rauch Court recognized that evidence is excluded when it is obtained in 
violation of a person's Article I, § 17 right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures. See id. at 592-93. Thus, when the Court held that "[t]he very sanctity of the 
home that underlies the passage of 'knock and announce' statutes ... requires that we 
exclude evidence seized as a result of the violation of those statutes," it necessarily held 
that the statutory violation in Rauch impacted constitutional rights, making the search 
unreasonable. See id. at 593. 
In State v. Mathews, 129 Idaho 865 (1997), the Idaho Supreme Court similarly 
held that if a search warrant is unsigned by a magistrate in violation of state statutes, 
"(o]nce the lack of a signature is discovered or raised, the search must stop until such 
time as the lack of a signature may be corrected by the signature of the magistrate. 
Failure to supply the signature once it is challenged will vitiate any further search under 
the warrant." Mathews, 129 Idaho at 870. In Mathews, officers served a search warrant 
that had not been signed by a magistrate or district judge on a residence, despite one of 
the occupants questioning the lack of a signature, and the officers recovered evidence 
as a result of the execution of the unsigned warrant. Id. at 866-67. 
The Mathews Court stated: "This Court from its earliest interpretation of Article 
I,§ 17 of the Idaho Constitution, has held that the right afforded individuals to protection 
of their person and homes is so fundamental as to require strict adherence to the 
constitutional and statutory requirements." Id. at 869. Under Article I, § 17 and similar 
provisions in the United States Constitution and other state constitutions, "it is 
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universally held that the search-warrant must conform strictly to the constitutional and 
statutory provisions providing for its issuance." Id. (quoting Purkey v. Maby, 33 Idaho 
281, 283 (1920)). The statutes requiring the signature of a judge on a warrant predated 
the Idaho Constitution, and they created "a substantive right in a citizen to refuse to 
permit a search pursuant to an undersigned warrant.' Id. That substantive right was 
affirmed by Article XXI, § 2 of the Idaho Constitution, and Article I, § 17 "further 
establishes the substantive rights of citizens to require a valid warrant for officers to 
search their home." Id. Thus, because the violation of the state statutes requiring a 
signed warrant impacted constitutional rights, the search under the unsigned warrant 
was unreasonable. See id. at 869-70. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has also indicated that a violation of state statute that 
impacts constitutional rights also renders a seizure unreasonable. In State v. Card, 137 
Idaho 182 (2002), the Court held that "the statutes relating to issuance, execution and 
return of search warrants supplement the constitutional prohibition against 
unreasonable search and seizures. Violation of the statutory scheme in this case 
resulted in an unreasonable search and seizure with respect to Card's office and home." 
Card, 137 Idaho at 187. In Card, employees of the Idaho Tax Commssion executed 
search warrants on a business and residence and filed returns for the search warrants 
and inventories of the items seized with the magistrate. Id. at 184. 
The Card Court stated that Article I, § 17 "protects an individual's right to be free 
from unreasonable search and seizure. This protection is supplemented by Idaho's 
statutory scheme governing search warrants." Id. at 185. The statutes governing 
search warrants mandated that only the officers mentioned in a search warrant could 
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serve the warrant; other persons could not serve the warrant, but could only aid the 
officers with the officers present and acting in the warrant's execution. Id. However, the 
search warrants in Card were executed by tax commission employees-even though 
police officers accompanied the tax commission employees, the officers took "an 
extremely passive role in the execution of the warrant." Id. at 187. The Court therefore 
held that "[t]he search by teams of tax commission employees exceeded assisting the 
officers and thereby did not comply with the statutory scheme enacted to prevent 
unlawful intrusion into an individual's home and business." Id. Thus, the "[v]iolation of 
the statutory scheme" in Card, because it impacted constitutional rights, "resulted in an 
unreasonable search and seizure." id. 
Conversely, Idaho jurisprudence indicates that statutory violations that merely 
amount to procedural errors do not render a search or seizure unreasonable under 
Article I, § 17, as long as the procedural errors do not impact constitutional rights. The 
Card Court explained that "Idaho case law makes it clear that where a search warrant is 
improperly returned or the inventory fails to list all items seized, the mistake is 
ministerial and the procedural defect does not merit suppression of the evidence absent 
a showing of prejudice by the defendant." Id. at 185. The defendant in Card did not 
show any prejudice from the preparation of the warrant and inventory by a tax 
commission employee, or from his return of them to the magistrate. Id. 
Later Idaho Supreme Court cases have also indicated that a procedural error that 
does not impact constitutional rights does not render a search unreasonable. See 
State v. Zueger, 143 Idaho 64 7, 650 (2006) ("[A] mere procedural error, which does not 
implicate the defendant's constitutionally protected rights, should not serve to invalidate 
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the othervvise properly issued warrant."); State v. Bicknell, 140 Idaho 201, 204-05 
(2004) ("The Defendants in these cases have not shown the alleged procedural 
error in the issuance of the search warrant here in any way impacted any of their 
substantive rights."). 
In Bicknell, the search warrant at issue was supported by a notarized affidavit, as 
opposed to an affidavit sworn to before a judge as required by the Idaho Criminal Rules. 
Bicknell, 140 Idaho at 203. In Zueger, a magistrate, rather than signing the search 
warrant at issue herself, instructed a prosecutor to sign the warrant on the magistrate's 
behalf. Zueger, 143 Idaho at 648. The Court in both cases held that, unlike the 
statutory violation in Mathews that "impacted the constitutional rights of the defendant," 
those statutory violations did not warrant suppression of the evidence. See Zueger, 143 
Idaho at 650; Bicknell, 140 Idaho at 204-05. Because the Court in Bicknell and Zueger 
did not suppress the evidence, and suppression is the appropriate remedy for 
unreasonable searches or seizures, those cases indicate that a procedural error that 
does not impact constitutional rights does not render a search unreasonable. 
Thus, long-standing jurisprudence indicates that a violation of a state statute that 
impacts constitutional rights renders a search or seizure unreasonable under Article 
I § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. This jurisprudence developed over the twenty-five 
years between Rauch and Card, with roots in Article I, § 17 case law stretching back 
nearly a hundred years. See Card, 137 Idaho at 187; Mathews, 129 Idaho at 869 
(quoting Purkey, 33 Idaho at 283); Rauch, 99 Idaho at 593 (quoting Anderson, 31 Idaho 
at 527 (Morgan, J., dissenting)). Rauch, Mathews and Card together indicate "that 
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Idaho's constitution provides greater protection than the analogous federal provision" in 
this context. See GOA Dairy Queen, 154 Idaho at 384. 
Here, the violation of I.C. § 49-1407 impacted Ms. Green's constitutional rights 
and therefore made her arrest unreasonable. An arrest is a quintessential seizure that 
implicates a person's freedom of movement. See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 624; 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553; see also Agundis, 127 Idaho at 592-93. Thus, just as the 
statutory scheme governing search warrants supplements the Idaho Constitution's 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, Card, 137 Idaho at 185, 187, 
I.C. § 49-1407 and other Idaho statutes governing arrests also supplement the 
protection provided by Article I, § 17. 
Much like the statutory violation in Card impacted the defendant's constitutional 
rights because it did not comply with the search warrant statutory scheme enacted to 
prevent unlawful intrusions, see Card, 137 Idaho at 187, the statutory violation here 
impacted Ms. Green's constitutional rights because the officer did not comply with the 
arrest statutes enacted to prevent such unlawful intrusions into her freedom of 
movement. Both here and in Card, the authorities exceeded their statutory authority, 
and the violations of state statutes impacted constitutional rights. See Card, 137 Idaho 
at 187. 
Further, the Mathews Court observed, in the context of search warrants, that "the 
right afforded individuals to protection of their persons and home is so fundamental as 
to require strict adherence to the constitutional and statutory requirements." Mathews, 
129 Idaho at 867 (emphasis added). Ms. Green submits that the same fundamental 
right to protection of her person was implicated in this context by her unlawful arrest, 
17 
id., and the statutory violation here impacted her constitutional rights under Article 
I, § 17. Thus, Ms. Green's arrest was unreasonable. 
The statutory violation here is distinguishable from the mere procedural errors in 
Bicknell and Zueger. The procedural errors in Bicknell and Zueger did not impact any 
constitutional rights. See Zueger, 143 Idaho at 650; Bicknell, 140 Idaho at 204-05. In 
contrast, the statutory violation here impacted Ms. Green's constitutional rights because 
the unlawful arrest subjected her to a quintessential seizure, restricted her freedom of 
movement, and intruded into her fundamental right to protection of her person. See 
Card, 137 Idaho at 187; Mathews, 129 Idaho at 867; see also Hodari 0., 499 U.S. at 
624; Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553; Agundis, 127 Idaho at 592-93. Thus, it cannot be 
said that the statutory violation here was a mere procedural error that did not impact 
constitutional rights. 
In sum, a violation of a state statute that impacts constitutional rights renders a 
search or seizure unreasonable under Article I § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. The 
violation of I.C. § 49-1407 here impacted Ms. Green's constitutional rights and made her 
arrest unreasonable. 
D. Because Ms. Green's Arrest Was Unreasonable, The District Court Correctly 
Found That Suppression Was The Appropriate Remedy 
Ms. Green asserts that, because her arrest was unreasonable, the district court 
in this case correctly found that suppression was the appropriate remedy. 
"The exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy for searches and seizures 
that violate the Constitution." Koivu, 152 Idaho at 518. Under Idaho's exclusionary rule, 
evidence obtained in violation of a defendant's constitutional rights under Article I, § 17 
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is generally not admissible into evidence. See id. at 516. As the Rauch Court 
observed, "The rule is well settled in this state that evidence, procured in violation of 
defendant's constitutional immunity from search and seizure, is inadmissible and will be 
excluded if request for its suppression be timely made." Rauch, 99 Idaho at 592-93 
(quoting State v. Conner, 59 Idaho at 703) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Idaho's exclusionary rule encompasses evidence obtained directly or indirectly 
from the violation: "Generally, if evidence is not seized pursuant to a recognized 
exception to the warrant requirement, the evidence discovered as a result of the 
warrantless search must be excluded as the fruit of the poisonous tree." State v. Deisz, 
145 Idaho 826, 829 (Ct. App. 2008); see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 
487-88 (1963) (discussing fruit of the poisonous tree under the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule); State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810-11 (2009) (same). 
Idaho's exclusionary rule is "an independent exclusionary rule based on the state 
constitution that had developed over sixty-five years." Donato, 135 Idaho at 472 (citing 
Guzman, 122 Idaho at 991 ). The purposes of Idaho's exclusionary rule are to: 
(1) provide an effective remedy to persons who have been subjected to an 
unreasonable search and/or seizure; (2) deter the police from acting unlawfully in 
obtaining evidence; (3) encourage thoroughness in the warrant issuing process; 
(4) avoid having the judiciary commit an additional constitutional violation by considering 
evidence which has been obtained through illegal means; and (5) preserve judicial 
integrity. Guzman, 122 Idaho at 993. 1 
1 In Koivu, the Idaho Supreme Court clarified that Justice Bistline authored the opinion 
in Guzman, but the other justices in the majority either concurred in part or concurred in 
19 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, where a statutory violation impacted 
constitutional rights and rendered a search or seizure unreasonable, suppression is the 
appropriate remedy. As discussed above, the Rauch Court held that "[t]he very sanctity 
of the home that underlies the passage of 'knock and announce' statutes . . . requires 
that we exclude evidence seized as a result of the violation of those statutes." Rauch, 
99 Idaho at 593. Similarly, the Mathews Court held that, where a search is conducted 
under an unsigned search warrant, '"Evidence' obtained in such an unauthorized search 
is not admissible." Mathews, 129 Idaho at 870. 
Card indicates that the remedy of suppression also applies to statutory violations 
that lead to unreasonable seizures. After the Idaho Supreme Court in Card concluded 
that "[v]iolation of the statutory scheme in this case resulted in an unreasonable search 
and seizure," it held that "[s]uppression of the evidence is an appropriate remedy to 
discourage the government agents from engaging in reasonable searches and seizures 
in violation of the state constitution." Card, 137 at 187 (citing Rauch, 99 Idaho 586). 
Because the Idaho Supreme Court has previously held that suppression is the 
appropriate remedy where a statutory violation impacted constitutional rights and 
rendered a search or seizure unreasonable, the State's worry that suppression would 
"frustrate rather than further state policy" (App. Br., pp.9-10 (quoting Moore, 553 U.S. at 
174)), is unfounded. While the United States Supreme Court noted iri Moore that 
"Virginia does not . . . ordinarily exclude from criminal trials evidence obtained in 
violation of its statutes," Moore, 553 U.S. at 174, Rauch, Mathews and Card establish 
that the Idaho Supreme Court has excluded evidence obtained in violation of Idaho 
the result. Koivu, 152 Idaho at 518. "Therefore, a majority rejected the good-faith 
exception, but a majority did not agree upon the reasons for doing so." Id. 
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statutes. Card, 137 187; Mathews, 1 Idaho at 870; Rauch, 99 Idaho 
at 593. 
The district court also correctly noted that "suppression may well be the only 
remedy for the Defendant in this case." (R., pp.169, 326.) Unlike the exclusionary rule 
under the Fourth Amendment, which only serves to deter police misconduct, see 
Guzman, 122 Idaho at 992, Idaho's exclusionary rule is intended to provide an effective 
remedy to persons who have been subjected to an unreasonable search and/or seizure. 
See id. at 993. The district court observed that "it seems unlikely that Defendant has a 
remedy in tort" for false arrest. (R., pp.169, 326.) Indeed, Idaho law specifically 
exempts "[a] governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course and 
scope of their employment and without malice or criminal intent" from liability for any 
claim that "[a]rises out of . . . false arrest." I.C. § 6-904(3). Thus, suppression under 
Idaho's exclusionary rule is likely Ms. Green's only remedy here. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has previously held that suppression is the 
appropriate remedy where a statutory violation impacted constitutional rights and 
rendered a search or seizure unreasonable. Idaho's exclusionary rule is intended to 
provide an effective remedy to persons who have been subjected to an unreasonable 
search and/or seizure. Suppression is likely Ms. Green's only remedy here. Thus, the 
district court correctly found that suppression is the appropriate remedy. 
E. State v. Card Has Not Been Abrogated By Later Decisions Of The Idaho 
Supreme Court 
As a matter of first impression for the Idaho Supreme Court, Ms. Green asserts 
that State v. Card, 137 Idaho 182 (2002), has not been abrogated by later decisions of 
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the Idaho Supreme Court. The district court relied upon Card when it found that 
suppression was the appropriate remedy here (R., pp.167-69, 323-25), and Card is part 
of the long-standing jurisprudence indicating that Ms. Green's arrest was unreasonable 
under Article I, § 17. However, the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Branigh, i 55 
Idaho 404 (Ct. App. 2013), rev. denied (Dec. 9, 2013), recently stated that Card 
"appears to have been abrogated by later decisions," i.e., by Bicknell and Zueger. See 
Branigh, 155 Idaho at 414. 
The Idaho Supreme Court does not take abrogation of its previous decisions 
lightly. The Court "will ordinarily not overrule one of our prior opinions unless it is shown 
to have been manifestly wrong, or the holding in the case has proven over time to be 
unwise or unjust." Koivu, 152 Idaho at 518. 
The later decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court have not abrogated Card. 
Bicknell and Zueger do not indicate that Card is manifestly wrong, unwise or unjust, see 
Koivu, 152 Idaho at 518, because those three Idaho Supreme Court cases are actually 
all in accord.2 The procedural errors in Bicknell and Zueger, like the procedural errors 
involving the warrant inventory and return in Card, did not impact constitutional rights 
and thus did not render the searches in Bicknell or Zueger unreasonable. See Zueger, 
143 Idaho at 648; Bicknell, 140 Idaho at 204-05; Card, 137 Idaho at 186. In contrast, 
the execution of the search warrant by tax commission employees in Card was a 
statutory violation that impacted constitutional rights, rendering the search and seizure 
2 In Branigh, the Idaho Court of Appeals also mentioned the Idaho Supreme Court's 
decision in State v. Benefiel, 131 Idaho 226 (1998). Branigh, 155 Idaho at 413. 
Benefiel is inapposite here, because the Idaho Supreme Court decided that case solely 
on the basis of the Fourth Amendment. See Benefiel, 131 Idaho at 229. 
22 
that case unreasonable under Article I,§ 17 of the Idaho Constitution. Card, 1 
Idaho at 187. Thus, Card has not been abrogated.3 
In sum, Ms. Green's arrest was unreasonable because it was a statutory violation 
that impacted her constitutional rights. Because her arrest was unreasonable, the 
district court correctly found that suppression was the appropriate remedy. Card, the 
basis for the district court's finding on suppression, has not been abrogated. Thus, the 
district court's order granting Ms. Green's motions to suppress should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Ms. Green respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
district court's order granting her motions to suppress. 
DATED this 26th day of August, 2014. 
BEN P. MCGREEVY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
3 The Idaho Supreme Court recently declined to overrule Rauch to the extent that it 
"held that there were reasons supporting the exclusionary rule under than deterring 
unconstitutional searches and seizures that the law enforcement officers did not 
reasonably believe were lawful." Koivu, 152 Idaho at 518. 
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